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Abstract. Mixer services purportedly remove all connections between
the input (deposited) Bitcoins and the output (withdrawn) mixed Bit-
coins, seemingly rendering taint analysis tracking ineffectual. In this pa-
per, we introduce and explore a novel tracking strategy, called Address
Taint Analysis, that adapts from existing transaction-based taint anal-
ysis techniques for tracking Bitcoins that have passed through a mixer
service. We also investigate the potential of combining address taint anal-
ysis with address clustering and backward tainting. We further introduce
a set of filtering criteria that reduce the number of false-positive results
based on the characteristics of withdrawn transactions and evaluate our
solution with verifiable mixing transactions of nine mixer services from
previous reverse-engineering studies. Our finding shows that it is possible
to track the mixed Bitcoins from the deposited Bitcoins using address
taint analysis and the number of potential transaction outputs can be
significantly reduced with the filtering criteria.
1 Introduction
A Bitcoin mixer service (also commonly known as tumblers or laundering ser-
vices) is a cryptocurrency service that allows users to “anonymise” their Bitcoins
by eliminating any possible connection between their original deposited Bitcoins
and the mixed Bitcoins that they withdraw later from the service [6, 16]. This
mixing process can make the tracking of Bitcoin movements between addresses
challenging, such as when using techniques like taint analysis [11]. Mixer services
are also frequently used as one of the core components in transaction obscuring
for illicit activities, such as theft, ransomware, and dark market trade [15,17].
In a normal Bitcoin transaction, address A would send Bitcoins directly to
address B. However, this interaction establishes a connection between the two
addresses in the blockchain, allowing anyone to observe the movement of Bit-
coins [13]. Mixer services attempt to prevent this traceability by serving as an
intermediary between the two addresses where Address A deposits Bitcoins to a
mixer service address (receiver address) for mixing. Next, the mixer service uses
another address(es) (delivery address) to deliver completely unrelated Bitcoins
to address B in withdrawn transactions.
As a result, the interaction between address A and B is obscured in the
blockchain, as there is no direct connection or transaction between the two end-
point addresses. Furthermore, simple transaction tracking methods are incapable
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of tracking the actual exchange of Bitcoins between the two addresses. One
method used to track the mixed Bitcoins is to calculate every possible combi-
nation on every transaction within the mixing time for the potential withdrawn
transaction outputs [19], which requires computational resources.
Few studies have investigated reverse-engineered mixer services to discover
their internal operations [3,11,18]. We are aware of only one study that proposed
a tracking method for mixed Bitcoins, which adapted from the aforementioned
approach, and evaluated their method on a single mixer service [19]. In par-
ticular, we are not aware of any proposed tracking method to overcome the
transaction obscuring feature of mixer services.
Hence, in this paper we introduce a novel tracking method called address
taint analysis that focuses on tainting at the address level, whereas previous
taint analysis approaches have focused on tainting at the transaction level. We
investigate this method, both on its own and in combination with other tracking
methods such as address clustering and backward tainting. We also introduce
a set of filtering criteria in an attempt to reduce the number of false-positive
results, and we evaluate our solutions with verifiable mixing transactions of nine
mixer services from previous reverse-engineering studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the related
work in Section 2. We define our new methods and filtering criteria in Section 3.
Using the sample cases presented in Section 4, we evaluate the results of these
methods and discuss the results in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude and
discuss improvements we envision.
2 Related Work
2.1 Taint Analysis
Taint analysis is a transaction tracking method that determines the relationship
or connection of addresses based on exchanges of specific Bitcoins in transac-
tions [11]. It is often adapted to track the movement of specific Bitcoins (e.g.,
stolen Bitcoins) by classifying the tracked Bitcoins as tainted or clean and cal-
culating the distribution of tainted Bitcoins used in subsequent transactions.
One taint analysis method, the Poison method, considers all of the resulting
transaction outputs as fully tainted [12]. There are other tainting strategies that
utilise different approaches of tracking and distributing Bitcoins, such as the
Haircut method [12] and FIFO method (First In, First Out) [1]. Taint analysis
can also be performed backwards, where instead of tainting forward to the next
transaction, the algorithm taints backwards following previous transactions, pos-
sibly all the way back to the coinbase transaction where the Bitcoins originate
from [1].
Aside from transaction tracking, taint analysis is utilised to measure the effec-
tiveness of transaction obscuring methods where results with tainted connections
indicate that the obscuring method is ineffective and can still be tracked [9,14].
We hereafter refer to the original transaction-based taint analysis as transaction
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taint analysis to distinguish it from the address-based taint analysis we define
in this paper (see Section 3.1).
2.2 Address Clustering
Address clustering is a method that operates by grouping addresses into a cluster
based on specific transaction behaviours. Address clustering methods are utilised
in de-anonymisation which attempts to classify Bitcoin addresses likely to belong
to the same user for tackling illegal activities [10].
One address clustering method, called input-sharing clustering or multi-input
heuristic, is based on the assumption that all the addresses that share inputs
in the same transaction belong to the same entity because every input address
must sign a digital signature with its private key for the transaction to be valid.
As such, if there are two or more input addresses in the same transaction, these
addresses are being controlled by the same user [5].
Although this address clustering method has the advantage of relying only on
information available inside the Bitcoin blockchain, it is frequently considered to
be less effective for de-anonymisation purposes due to the existence of CoinJoin1.
Input-sharing clustering classifies every address that shares input in the same
transaction via CoinJoin as belonging to the same user. As a result, input-sharing
clustering will create inaccurate address clusters that belong to different users
and cannot be practically utilised for de-anonymisation purposes.
Another clustering approach, ‘change address clustering’, operates by clus-
tering the input addresses with the output addresses that are likely to be the
change addresses – this is an address that is owned by the transaction’s sender
and which receives the remaining change Bitcoins in the transaction2 [10].
3 Methodology
In this section we describe the address taint analysis method and the other
tracking methods, address clustering and backward tainting methods, that we
evaluate in combination with address taint analysis. Subsequently, we discuss
the filtering criteria we develop and the rationales behind them.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our four tracking methods and filtering cri-
teria, we compare the number of tainted transaction outputs of each method to
the baseline of all outputs occurring in the same time frame. Our definition of
the baseline is based on work from a previous study [19].
Baseline All outputs of every transaction recorded in the blockchain within the
tainting time frame of a given sample case.
1 CoinJoin is a method which allows multiple users to combine their Bitcoin transac-
tions in a single transaction to improve their transaction privacy [8].
2 For example, if address A uses a 10 Bitcoins input to send 5 Bitcoins to address
B, the owner of address A will need a change address (either address A or another
address) to receive 5 Bitcoins back.
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3.1 Address Taint Analysis
The majority of mixer services usually utilise either a central address or multiple
central addresses in order to combine and mix deposited Bitcoins from their
users [3, 11, 18]. We assume that the receiver and delivery addresses within the
mixer services are both likely to interact with the central addresses at some point
in time.
Our taint analysis method, Address Taint Analysis, is shown in Figure 1. It
operates at the address connection level, where any address that has received any
Bitcoin from tainted addresses at any point in time will be considered a tainted
address. Existing taint analysis methods operate at the transaction level, where
the tainted Bitcoins of a received address do not affect other Bitcoins belonging
to that address, unless they are used together in the same transactions.
Fig. 1: (Transaction) taint analysis and address taint analysis
The figure depicts the difference between the transaction taint analysis and
address taint analysis methods on an example mixing case that shows the de-
posited transaction from address A and the withdrawn transaction to address
B. A small white circle represents a clean address and a grey circle represents
a tainted address. A black arrow indicates a transaction that involves tainted
Bitcoins, while a dashed line with a white arrow indicates a transaction that
does not involve tainted Bitcoins.
The assumption for address taint analysis is that any transaction and address
that can be connected to the receiver addresses at any point in time, whether
directly or indirectly, may be related to the mixer service in some ways. Therefore
the objective of address taint analysis is not only to track the mixed Bitcoins,
but to also map the network of address clusters and their transactions that may
involve the mixer service operation, similar to the concept of network analysis [7].
Hence, address taint analysis tracking should be able to discover a relationship
between the deposited and withdrawn transactions that the transaction taint
analysis is unable to accomplish, as shown in Figure 1.
We describe three methods below for using address taint analysis (one fur-
ther method, is described in Section 3.2). The first method uses only address
taint analysis. For the second and third methods, we investigate the potential of
incorporating address clustering methods into the address taint analysis in or-
der to improve the address cluster tracking results. As de-anonymisation is not
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our primary objective, we utilise the address clustering method to assist the ad-
dress taint analysis algorithm for capturing relationships between addresses that
are outside the scope of address taint analysis, which regard only the Bitcoin
movement (address A sends Bitcoins to address B).
Method 1 Address taint analysis only.
The operation of address taint analysis used in this paper is conceptually
similar to Poison transaction tainting [12] as the entire address is considered
tainted, regardless of the number of tainted Bitcoins involved but goes further
by affecting every Bitcoin possessed by the address throughout time. Since our
main priority is to discover the connection between the deposited and withdrawn
Bitcoins, other transaction tainting methods, which generally emphasise the dis-
tribution of tainting proportions, would not provide further information for this
purpose.
As mixer services typically perform the mixing operation continuously, it is
possible for the service to deliver Bitcoins that are already mixed prior to the
time of the deposited transactions. As such, address taint analysis will also need
to taint from the time period before the deposited transactions occurred. To put
it simply, address taint analysis will taint all Bitcoins that the tainted addresses
send both before and after the deposited transactions time.
Method 2 Address taint analysis with input-sharing clustering.
We use the input-sharing clustering method coupled with address taint anal-
ysis to taint any address that shares inputs with the tainted addresses. We use
the same hypothesis as the original input-sharing clustering for our adaptation –
any address that shares input in the same transaction with any tainted address
is also likely to be one of the mixer service addresses and will be classified as a
tainted address.
Method 3 Address taint analysis with input-sharing and output-sharing clus-
tering.
As an augmentation to Method 2, here we also incorporate the output-sharing
clustering method with the assumption that in the case of the mixing operation,
the central addresses would often distribute the mixed Bitcoins to other mixer
addresses first, before delivering them to the users. Consequently, we expect that
output-sharing clustering should improve the chance of tracking such scenarios,
even if the delivery addresses of the mixer service never send mixed Bitcoins to
one another, or share input in the transaction.
3.2 Backward Address Taint Analysis
The address taint analysis method operates with the assumption that the de-
posited and withdrawn mixer addresses may have an indirect connection with
each other because of the presence of the central addresses. It will be unable to
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Fig. 2: Address taint analysis and backward address taint analysis
The figure depicts mixer service with two separate groups tainted with address
taint analysis and backward address taint analysis. Notice the lack of any in-
teraction between the address A and B groups. B K represents the withdrawn
output(s) from a known case used for backward address tainting in Method 4.
In the backward address taint analysis, the lighter grey colour represent taint-
ing result of backward address taint analysis and the darker grey colour circle
represent tainting result of address taint analysis performed after backward
address taint analysis (Method 4).
discover any connection between the deposited inputs and withdrawn transac-
tion outputs if there is no such connection, as shown in Figure 2.
In such situation, address tainting from the deposited address cannot reach
the withdrawal address. However, the knowledge of pre-existing withdrawal ad-
dresses could be used to identify the targeted withdrawal address. The search
would consist of tainting backward from this known withdrawal address and
then forward towards potential withdrawal addresses.
Therefore, we introduce another method for this scenario by applying back-
ward tainting to address taint analysis to create another tracking method called
Backward Address Taint Analysis. This method operates by tainting any address
that sends Bitcoins to a tainted address. Rather than attempting to discover the
connection between the mixed Bitcoins, the purpose of this method is to inves-
tigate whether it’s possible to discover the address clusters used for withdrawn
transactions. The idea would be that these addresses could subsequently be used
to find the targeted withdrawn transaction outputs. Thus, this method operates
in two steps, as described in the example below.
Method 4 Perform Method 3 on the results of backward address taint analysis
on the known pre-existing withdrawn transactions from the same mixer service.
Using the example from Figure 2, Method 4 starts by performing the back-
ward taint analysis variation of the address taint analysis from the withdrawn
transactions of another case from the same mixer service (B K) for three days
to trace the mixed Bitcoins back to the central address clusters. Next, we use
the results of backward address taint analysis to perform address taint analysis
at the time of the deposited transactions of the targeted sample case (A).
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3.3 Filtering Criteria
To further reduce the number of false-positive results, we define five filtering
criteria based on the information of the withdrawn transactions obtained from
reverse-engineering experiments of previous studies [3, 11,18].
The criteria can be applied for mixed Bitcoins in general with appropriate
calibration. The calibration of the criteria parameters can also be specified to be
stricter to reduce the false-positive results even further but this can increase the
risk of missing the target. The parameters used in this experiment are obtained
from observing the sample cases provided by the studies mentioned above. We set
the parameters conservatively to reduce the risk of losing the targeted withdrawn
transactions for this experiment. In establishing the filtering criteria for our
investigation we had the advantage of knowing the target withdrawn outputs
that we were searching for. For future studies we plan to investigate the criteria
on data with unknown target values.
Criterion 1 (Value of Withdrawn Bitcoins) The transaction output value
of the targeted withdrawn transaction outputs cannot be higher than the deposited
input value minus the mixing fee.
As mixer services typically subtract a specific mixer service fee3 from the
initial deposited Bitcoins, the amount of the withdrawn Bitcoins would be lower
than the original deposited amount. Depending on the mixer service, the mixing
fee can vary in a specific range, such as between 1-2% of the deposited Bitcoins.
For this experiment, we use a minimum mixing fee for this criterion.
This criterion does have at least one limitation, as it may be possible for the
mixer services to combine the withdrawal of multiple deposited Bitcoins, which
can make the withdrawn transaction outputs larger than the deposited input.
Criterion 2 (Withdrawn transaction’s shape) The number of transaction
inputs and outputs of the targeted withdrawn transactions must be in the same
pattern as the other withdrawn transactions by the same mixer service.
The reverse-engineering examples from the literature [3,11,18] show that the
mixer services usually perform withdrawn transactions in a specific pattern. For
example, one of the most common shapes of withdrawn transaction is in the
form of a one-to-two addresses transaction where a single transaction output
is sent to two addresses, one belonging to the user and the other to the mixer
service.
A limitation of this criterion is that it is also possible for the mixer service to
randomise the shape pattern or have an exception scenario (e.g., the withdrawn
Bitcoins are large valued so that the service needs to combine other inputs in
a withdrawn transaction) that can make the targeted withdrawn transaction
different from the common pattern.
3 Note that mixer service fee is different from Bitcoin transaction fee, which is men-
tioned in Criterion 5.
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Criterion 3 (Withdrawn transaction chain’s shape) If the mixing algo-
rithm has a continuous withdrawn transaction chain pattern (e.g., peeling chain
shown in Figure 3), either the transaction prior or after the targeted withdrawn
transactions must have the same number of transaction inputs and outputs as
the common pattern.
Following from Criterion 2, the reverse-engineering results of the mixing sam-
ple cases indicate that multiple mixer services usually perform the withdrawn
transactions in a continuous peeling chain (as shown in Figure 3), where a single
transaction input with a large amount of Bitcoins is continuously peeled into
two transaction outputs with one typically much smaller than the other [3].
Fig. 3: Example of a peeling chain
The figure depicts the peeling chain of a transaction chain that is commonly
used by mixer services. A black circle represents a delivery address that belongs
to the mixer service and a white circle represents a user address that receives
a withdrawn transaction output.
As such, either the previous or next transaction of the targeted withdrawn
transactions must also follow the peeling chain pattern, accounting for the pos-
sibility that the targeted withdrawn transactions can be at the start or end of
the withdrawn transaction chain.
Similar to a limitation for Criterion 2, the mixer service can randomise the
transaction chain shape or simply does not have one, which can increase the risk
of missing the targeted outputs or make this criterion inapplicable.
Criterion 4 (Reused addresses) The input address in the targeted withdrawn
transactions is not used as transaction input more than once in its lifetime.
Our analysis of the verifiable mixing transactions from previous studies shows
that the majority of the mixer services never reuse their delivery addresses before
and after the withdrawn transaction. Therefore, we can utilise this information
as a criterion to exclude any transaction with input addresses that have been
reused at any point in time.
A limitation of this criterion is that although generally mixer services do
avoid reusing the same address more than once, which is one of the most common
Bitcoin privacy practices [2], it is possible for a mixer service to disregard this
practice.
Criterion 5 (Withdrawn transaction fee) The transaction fee value of the
targeted withdrawn transactions must be the same as in other withdrawn trans-
actions in the same time period.
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From our own analysis of the verifiable mixing transactions from the previous
studies, we detected a specific pattern in the transaction fee values of the with-
drawn transactions. In particular, the transaction fee value were commonly the
same specific amount, such as 0.0005 BTC or 0.0001 BTC, even with a different
transaction fee per byte ratio4 and at a different time and day. This suggests
that mixer services generally do not automatically adjust the transaction fee
setting in real-time but by a specific amount of time. As such, if the transaction
fee always remains constant for the other withdrawn transactions in a similar
time by the same mixer service, we can use the transaction fee as a criterion to
exclude unrelated transactions.
Similar to the other criteria, it is possible for a mixer service to not have the
practice of using a constant transaction fee for a period of time, which would
make this criterion inapplicable.
4 Sample Cases
We use 15 mixing transactions samples from previous studies [3, 11, 18] which
have shown that transaction taint analysis could not taint the withdrawn Bit-
coins from the deposited Bitcoins. We show these samples in Table 1. These stud-
ies perform reverse engineering on prominent mixer services: Blockchain.info’s
Shared Send function, Bitcoin Fog, Bitlaundry, BitLaunder, DarkLaunder, Al-
phabay and Helix Light. As one study [18] chose to not publicly name their tested
mixer services, we will also exclude any identifiable information of the services
and transactions, and refer the mixer services from that study as Unnamed.
For the address taint analysis experiment we use the transaction hash of
deposited transactions to perform the address taint analysis and the transaction
hash of withdrawn transactions are used to verify whether the address taint
analysis can successfully reconnect the withdrawn Bitcoins back to the original
deposited Bitcoins. If all of the targeted withdrawn transactions appear in the
tainting results, we consider the experiment successful for that sample case.
In some of the mixing sample cases a change address that belongs to the user
and is reused to interact with the withdrawn Bitcoins later on is used. This type
of scenario can severely decrease the effectiveness of mixer services and make
the mixed Bitcoins easily traceable. As user error is an extraneous variable that
is not related to the mixer services and can affect the results of our experiment,
we exclude any such change addresses from the deposited transactions.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 Address Taint Analysis
We set the time limit for the address taint analysis operation to begin tainting
from five days before the deposited transactions until the maximum amount of
4 Transaction fee per byte ratio is a metric to calculate the recommended transaction
fee often used by miners to determine which transactions should be prioritised to
maximise their mining profit.
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Case Service Baseline Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
1 Blockchain.info 485,155 — — 451,840 n/a
2 Bitcoin Fog 713,899 — — — 682,901
3 Bitcoin Fog 1,525,276 — — — 1,495,431
4 BitLaundry 1,013,374 841,563 845,846 976,745 989,264
5 BitLaundry 1,016,043 843,277 847,662 984,089 463,584
6 Unnamed 1 1,337,727 1,111,329 1,121,851 1,233,912 n/a
7 Unnamed 2 1,264,966 1,065,511 1,074,187 1,172,663 n/a
8 Bitlaunder 1,867,536 1,505,252 1,525,339 1,739,058 1,668,100
9 Bitlaunder 2,156,487 1,712,671 1,731,779 2,006,007 1,919,906
10 Darklaunder 1,712,521 1,407,023 1,421,073 1,606,730 1,637,210
11 Darklaunder 1,845,130 1,495,535 1,527,367 1,730,747 1,745,119
12 Alphabay 1,949,670 1,576,817 1,612,756 1,823,635 1,874,048
13 Alphabay 2,175,263 1,770,505 1,800,171 2,055,219 2,055,248
14 Helix Light 1,858,540 1,406,001 1,434,067 1,732,733 1,750,071
15 Helix Light 1,777,542 1,326,101 1,358,043 1,669,601 1,669,599
Table 1: Number of transaction outputs with each address tainting method
A horizontal line in a cell indicates that the method’s experiment for the sam-
ple case was unsuccessful. The letter “n/a” indicates the absence of experiment
for that method. (Method 4 requires another case of the same mixer service to
performed). The colour in each cell represents the percentage of the method’s
transaction output number compared to the Baseline method. The lighter the
colour, the lower the percentage.
mixing time allowed by the mixer service (e.g., BitLaundry allows up to max-
imum 10 days mixing time). If the mixer service did not have a mixing time
setting, we set the time limit to three days.
As shown in Table 1, the results of our experiment demonstrate that even
mixed Bitcoins are not always perfectly immune to tracking. The majority
of the sample cases show successful results for all three methods except for
Blockchain.info and Bitcoin Fog cases where the target withdrawn outputs could
not be found. The address taint analysis methods manage to accomplish the ex-
periment’s main objective, which is to reconnect the original deposited Bitcoins
to the mixed Bitcoins, albeit with the extensive spreading of the tainted results.
It should be noted that the number of transaction outputs in Table 1 (and later
in Table 3) only count from when the deposited transactions occurred until the
end of mixing time limit.
For the majority of sample cases, Method 1 yields the lowest number of trans-
action outputs compared to the other three methods and the Baseline method,
followed by Method 2 and lastly Method 3. The number of transaction outputs
for Method 1 is considerably lower than the Baseline method at roughly 20%
for the successful cases. For example, Method 1 has 21% (443,816) fewer trans-
actions than the Baseline for Case 9, and 17% (171,811) fewer transactions in
Case 4.
The results of Method 2 are generally similar to those of Method 1. For
example, Method 2 has only 1% (8,676) more transactions than Method 1 in
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Case 7, and 2% (35,939) more in Case 12. Meanwhile, Method 3 produces a
greater number of transaction outputs compared to the first two methods and is
much closer to the Baseline method. For example, Method 3 has 12% (199,707)
more transactions output than Method 1 in Case 10, and 6% (105,791) fewer
than the Baseline method. As such, our results suggest that the incorporation
of address clustering and backward tainting methods is not always necessary for
the tracking of mixer services though a few cases, Bitcoin.info’s Shared Send and
Bitcoin Fog, are notable exceptions from our data set.
5.2 Backward Address Tainting
As shown in Table 1, the address taint analysis experiment on the Bitcoin Fog
cases (2 and 3) produces unsuccessful results. This is because the mixer service
keeps the deposited Bitcoins idle for an extremely long time, which is outside
the time period verification for our experiments.
While the initial deposited transaction for Case 2 occurred on 29/04/2013,
the deposited Bitcoins were not used at all until 07/11/2013, even though the
withdrawn transactions occurred on 30/04/2013. This is similarly the situation
for Case 3. This type of scenario indicates that the central address clusters used
for deposited and withdrawn transactions are separate and cannot be connected
because of the time limit constraint in this experiment.
Method 4 shows successful results for all sample cases as shown in Table 1.
Although, aside from the Bitcoin Fog cases, both of the Method 4 tainting results
(and the results after applying filtering criteria – see Section 5.3) do not provide
improved results compared to the other three methods. In particular, the number
of transaction outputs resulting from Method 4 is higher than Method 3 in most
cases. For example, Method 4 has 2% (30,480) more transaction outputs than
Method 3 for Case 10 which is only 4% (75,311) lower than the Baseline method
results. However, there are some exceptions where Method 4 performs better
than Method 3 such as in Cases 5 and 9 where the number of transaction outputs
are 53% and 5% lower than Method 3, respectively.
Nevertheless, the results of the backward address tainting of Method 4 shows
that it is possible to defeat the mixer service operation with separate central ad-
dress clusters. If the attackers can initiate mixing transactions the same time
as the targeted mixing transactions so as to perform backward address taint-
ing, he/she can discover the central address clusters that are being used for
withdrawal of the targeted mixed Bitcoins.
5.3 Filtering Criteria
After performing address taint analysis on each sample case, we applied the
filtering criteria listed in Section 3.3 on each method’s results for every case,
as shown in Table 2. While the majority of the sample mixer services employ a
one-to-two peeling chain method (continuous one-to-two transaction), there are
some exceptions.
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Service Criterion 1 Criterion 2 Criterion 3 Criterion 4 Criterion 5
Blockchain.info 0.5% one-to-one one-to-two Y 10,000 Sat
Bitcoin Fog 1% one-to-two one-to-two Y 50,000 Sat
BitLaundry 2.49% one-to-two one-to-two Y 50,000 Sat
Unnamed 1 1.5% one-to-two one-to-two Y 10,000 Sat
Unnamed 2 1% one-to-two one-to-two Y 10,000 Sat
Bitlaunder 2% N N Y N
Darklaunder 2% N N Y N
Alphabay 10,000 Sat one-to-two N N N
Helix Light 2% one-to-many N Y 50,000 Sat
Table 2: Calibration of the filtering criteria applied to all mixer services
The letter “Y” indicates that the criteria can be applied to the mixer services
and the letter “N” indicates otherwise. The Bitcoin value is presented in Sat
or Satoshis, which is the smallest unit of the Bitcoin (1 Bitcoin is equal to
100,000,000 Satoshis).
– The Blockchain.info’s shared send function operates slightly differently than
the other mixer services. Instead of peeling the withdrawn Bitcoins and
sending them to the users directly, the service always peels off the withdrawn
Bitcoins and transfers them to one of its addresses first, before sending them
to the users in a one-to-one address transaction type. As such, Criteria 2
and 3 can still be applied for this mixer service case.
– The BitLaunder, DarkLaunder and Helix Light cases use a different version
of a peeling technique. Instead of continuous one-to-two address transactions,
the mixer services’ algorithm peels a single large value transaction input to
multiple transaction outputs (one-to-many). Additionally, the mixing algo-
rithm of the BitLaunder and DarkLaunder cases do not always perform the
withdrawal transactions in one specific pattern, hence we cannot apply Cri-
teria 2 and 3 for these two mixer services’ samples. Moreover, we also cannot
apply transaction fee Criterion 5 as the mentioned mixer services regularly
adjust the transaction fee based on the transaction size.
The address tainting results show significant improvement in terms of the
number of transaction outputs for all of the methods including the Baseline
method after applying the filtering criteria, as can be seen in the extensive
reduction in the transaction outputs number shown in Table 3. Assuming that
our assumptions are correct, and the filtering criteria are correctly adjusted, this
would mean that we’ve reduced a number of false positive transaction outputs.
For the sample cases that can apply more filtering criteria, which are Cases
1 to 7, 14 and 15, the number of false-positive transaction outputs is reduced
by from 90% to as high as 99%. Although the transaction output number after
applying filtering criteria for the first three methods is closer to the Baseline
method at around 10% lower. For example, the number of transaction outputs
for Method 1 in Case 5 is reduced by 97% (821,957), but when comparing to
the Baseline method’s results, the difference in transaction output number is
becoming less after applying the filtering criteria from 17% to only 6% lower.
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Case Service Baseline Criteria Method 1 Method 2 Method 3 Method 4
1 Blockchain.info 485,155 87 — — 84 —
2 Bitcoin Fog 713,899 9,804 — — — 9,428
3 Bitcoin Fog 1,525,276 12,945 — — — 12,320
4 BitLaundry 1,013,374 24,885 23,617 23,661 24,696 24,710
5 BitLaundry 1,016,043 22,712 21,320 21,361 22,376 10,236
6 Unnamed 1 1,337,727 51,099 37,593 37,951 44,440 —
7 Unnamed 2 1,264,966 48,626 38,102 38,587 43,705 —
8 Bitlaunder 1,867,536 385,811 335,268 335,966 373,020 347,389
9 Bitlaunder 2,156,487 428,042 371,251 372,103 411,334 380,805
10 Darklaunder 1,712,521 333,400 280,894 288,290 320,199 319,447
11 Darklaunder 1,845,130 367,516 299,026 315,474 353,674 354,285
12 Alphabay 1,949,670 181,512 154,426 157,425 174,487 174,419
13 Alphabay 2,175,263 227,718 178,960 180,799 215,534 215,539
14 Helix Light 1,858,540 6,329 5,764 5,778 6,166 6,172
15 Helix Light 1,777,542 6,160 5,731 5,792 6,009 6,009
Table 3: Resulting number of transaction outputs with each address tainting
method and after applying filtering criteria
The Criteria column refer to the number of transaction outputs of the Baseline
method after applying the filtering criteria. Each method column is the result
of the method after applying filtering criteria. The colour in each cell represents
the percentage of the method’s transaction output number after applying the
filtering criteria comparing to the Criteria column. The darker colour means
that percentage is closer to 100% of the baseline results after applying the
criteria.
While the sample cases that have less applicable filtering criteria, which are
Cases 8 to 13, generally have lower reduction number of transaction outputs at
around 80%. When compared to the result of the Baseline method after applying
filtering criteria, the number of transaction outputs show a larger reduction than
the other cases at around 20% lower. For example, the number of transaction
outputs for Method 1 in Case 11 is reduced by 80% (1,196,509) after applying
the filtering criteria, but is 18% (27,086) lower than the Baseline method.
However, there are cases where the results yield different result patterns. For
example, with Case 7 and 8, the number of transaction outputs is much lower
in the three methods compared to the baseline, unlike the other cases with less
applicable filtering criteria. Further, Method 1 in Case 6 has a transaction out-
puts (after applying filtering criteria) that are 27% less, and Case 7 has 22%
less than the baseline. Interestingly, Helix light cases (Case 14 and 15) show the
largest reductions in the number of transaction outputs. We hypothesise this is
because the constant 50,000 Sat transaction fee used in the one-to-many trans-
action type by the Helix service makes the withdrawn transactions extremely
unusual compared to the other transactions.
The differences in the results may be because the exploitable transaction pat-
terns of mixer services are exceedingly unique patterns that make their transac-
tions possess characteristics that are considerably different from other transac-
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tions. Thus, this makes them less difficult to distinguish. We hypothesise that the
fewer filtering criteria that can be applied to reduce the number of false-positive
results, the more of an advantage the address taint analysis can provide over the
Baseline method. Nevertheless, the significant reduction in transaction outputs
suggests that the filtering criteria can be adopted for other tracking methods of
mixer services in general.
5.4 Limitations
Despite the successful results and potential of the address taint analysis and
filtering criteria, there are limitations of our approach that we discuss below.
The number of tainted transaction outputs with and without the filtering
criteria are still relatively large when compared to the number of targeted with-
drawn transaction outputs, as can be seen in Table 1. The address taint analysis
in this paper taints the whole address, similar to the Poison method for trans-
action tainting, and does not utilise any other additional information besides
the information of the deposited transactions. Future research might attempt to
further reduce the number of potential outputs.
Similar to other transaction tracking methods, address taint analysis can
also be counteracted by the mixer services or the development of new privacy
enhancement techniques that defeat the tainting algorithm. This is similar to
how the CoinJoin method is introduced to oppose the input-sharing clustering
method or mixer services to prevent transaction taint analysis tracking. Hence,
the address taint analysis method will always require continuous development
and improvement to remain applicable to new transaction obscuring techniques.
The backward tainting approach is also not without challenges. The approach
operates with the requirement that the attacker needs to know which mixer
service is used for the targeted mixed Bitcoins. As shown in the Bitcoin Fog cases
the receiver addresses are not reused addresses and have a very long idle time
after receiving the deposited Bitcoins. It would be difficult to perform backward
tainting within a similar time frame unless the attacker can identify the mixer
service with other means in time, or simply perform backward tainting attacks
on every mixer service that uses this type of mixing algorithm.
Additionally, the risk increases if the mixer service uses a better randomised
mixing algorithm to obscure any exploitable pattern. As the filtering criteria
are currently designed based on the common transaction pattern found in the
withdrawn transactions, the current criteria would be less effective as shown in
the results of Table 3. This ultimately has a high probability to create inaccurate
results if the criteria are applied incorrectly. Thus, to avoid the risk of false
incrimination of innocent users, the tracking method should always be utilised
with caution and should only be implemented after a thorough exploration of
the mixing algorithm involved.
Tracking Mixed Bitcoins 15
6 Future Work and Conclusion
As transaction obscuring methods improve, so should tracking methods to re-
main effective and relevant. We identify two possible improvements for both
address taint analysis and filtering criteria, as follows;
– Utilising external information to improve tracking results. The external in-
formation of address ownership can be collected from online websites, forums
or services to exclude verifiable and reputable addresses that are unlikely to
be a part of the mixer services likes cryptocurrency exchange service from
the tainting results [4]. This in turn can significantly reduce both the tainting
operation time and the number of false-positive results. However, relying on
external information comes with the risk of false or fabricated information
depending on the source. Therefore, caution must be exercised to collect
information from reliable sources.
– Incorporating more complex address clustering methods. There is another ad-
dress clustering method that clusters based on transaction chain behaviour,
instead of a single transaction [5]. For example, when one address distributes
its Bitcoins to multiple other addresses, then those addresses transfer all of
the distributed Bitcoins to a single address. We can assume that most of the
addresses involved are likely to belong to the same user. Such a clustering
technique could also be combined to address taint analysis similarly to the
one we implemented in this paper.
The address taint analysis method we propose in this paper demonstrates a
good potential for reconnecting the original deposited Bitcoins to the mixed Bit-
coins – this has not been possible with taint analysis methods. We also illustrate
that address taint analysis can be incorporated with other tracking methods
such as address clustering and backward tainting for mixer services that utilise
an irregular mixing algorithm. Although the number of false-positive results is
still not substantially different than the Baseline method when implementing the
methods on their own, by exploiting the transaction pattern of the withdrawn
transactions to create filtering criteria, the number of false-positive results can
be reduced further.
With further improvement, our approach could possibly be used to assist
cryptocurrency regulation implementation and cryptocurrency crime forensics
in clearing the mystery of past illegal activities, such as exchange service thefts.
Nevertheless, more mixing samples from other mixer services are still required for
evaluating and improving the tracking method further, considering that mixer
services can evolve as new transaction obscuring techniques are introduced.
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